Managed care continues to grow as a part of state Medicaid programs.
Introduction
Managed care continues to grow as a part of state Medicaid programs.
Enrollment in full-risk HMOs increased by 40.6% between 1997 and 2001 1 . Despite the overall increase in enrollment, in many states there were fewer plans available and willing to serve an increasing number of enrollees (Holahan et al. 2002) . A small number of states have been unable to attract a sufficient number of plans and no longer have fullrisk managed care in their Medicaid programs. Managed care payment rates are a major issue for all states in their efforts to sustain Medicaid managed care. While other factors are important, rates clearly affect plans' willingness to participate in the program and the kinds of services they are able to offer and the providers they are able to attract (Coughlin et al. 2001 ).
We conducted a survey of Medicaid managed care payment methods and capitation rates in 1998 (Holahan et al. 1999) . Information was collected on how states set rates and how they made adjustments for differences in age and gender, treatment of maternity expenses, and benefits. We made adjustments for these and other factors to allow for comparisons of rates across states. Finally, we computed adjusted rates for each state which allowed state policymakers and other interested parties to understand how Medicaid programs were paying managed care plans across the states. The results showed a twofold variation in rates with the highest rates in Connecticut and
Massachusetts and the lowest in California.
This paper updates the earlier one by providing data on methods and rates employed by states in January 2001. As in the previous report we begin by discussing changes in Medicaid managed care enrollment by state. We then describe how states set rates, what adjustments are made for age, gender and maternity, risk factors such as HIV/AIDS, whether they make regional adjustments and which services are carved out from the benefit package. We next describe procedures we use in making adjustments for all of these factors-as the same set of adjustments used in 1998. We conclude by providing data on the levels of rates being used in the responding states.
Background
States have adopted Medicaid managed care both to contain costs as well as to improve access to care. There are two broad kinds of managed care: primary care case management (PCCM) programs and capitated health maintenance organizations (HMOs).
In general, PCCMs pay primary care physicians a fixed fee, generally $3 to $6 per member per month in addition to regular fee-for-service payments for care. Primary care physicians are expected to influence but are not held financially responsible for use of specialists and inpatient stays. Unlike PCCMs, capitated HMOs assume financial risk for inpatient and outpatient services and often for prescription drugs, dental care and other services. Plans receive a fixed dollar amount per month per beneficiary for a specified benefit package.
Research evidence suggests that PCCMs have had some effect on providing access to a usual source of care, but little effect on utilization. HMOs have had similar effects on access to a usual source of care but greater impacts on utilization (Zuckerman et al. 2002 and Garrett et al. 2001) . States in general have moved toward capitated HMO alternatives as their preferred strategy. In general they believe that HMOs are more effective at controlling costs and also help achieve budget predictability. of plans, most have fewer than ten plans and many states fewer than five. Other studies suggest the number of plans participating has declined in recent years (Holahan et al. 2002 and Felt-Lisk 1999) . Many states have found it increasingly difficult to retain commercial plan participation in Medicaid and as a result a higher share of plans are Medicaid-only plans compared with previous years. there were major shifts in the structure of their Medicaid managed care programs with a large increase in enrollment of full-risk plans and declines in use of PCCM arrangements.
On the other hand, in a number of states there were declines in enrollment in
Medicaid (full-risk) managed care. Georgia, Maine, Mississippi and Vermont ended their full-risk programs and other states including Hawaii, Illinois, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and West Virginia experienced a significant decline in Medicaid managed care (full-risk) enrollment. In still another set of states there were substantial increases in PCCM programs.
The increased enrollment in Medicaid managed care in a substantial number of states, together with declines in others, and the evidence on the reduced number of plans in many states, means that Medicaid managed care is surviving but struggling. The goal of Medicaid managed care was providing Medicaid enrollees with access to mainstream managed care plans. But a large number of these plans have now left the market, citing increased frustration with Medicaid managed care, particularly inadequate capitation rates and the onerous administrative demands of state Medicaid programs (Coughlin et al. 1994 ). States often counter that mainstream plans were attracted to Medicaid when enrollment was voluntary since rates were attractive because managed care plans attracted healthier beneficiaries. Since rates were based on the average level of expenditures they were more than adequate to serve the healthier than average beneficiary. As states moved to mandatory enrollment Medicaid beneficiaries who were less healthy enrolled in plans and, it is alleged, rates typically were not increased to compensate for the change in case mix.
The result was that mainstream plans found capitation rates increasingly inadequate. Together with other issues they faced in Medicaid and in the commercial market, continued participation in MMC became increasingly unattractive leading to an exit of a large number of the mainstream plans in many states. States also faced the need to protect safety net providers because Medicaid has been a major source of revenue for providers that serve the uninsured. These providers were often closely linked with Medicaid-only plans. The preferences given to these plans in some states also made it more difficult for mainstream plans to be competitive. Many states now have fewer commercial plans and increasingly rely on Medicaid-only plans. In this environment states still need to adequately pay these plans because Medicaid is such an important source of the revenues for their providers. Thus, rate adequacy is important both because many states are still attempting to retain commercial plans in MMC and because of the dependence of safety net providers on Medicaid revenues.
Survey Design
We Hampshire is the only state reporting that they have moved to competitive bidding.
Capitation Rate Adjustments
The capitation rate data that states originally submitted to us are presented in Table 5 . There were extraordinary variations in the capitation rate data that states originally submitted to us, reflecting the differences in the ways states established rates.
A direct comparison of these data across states would not be meaningful. In this section we describe the kinds of adjustments that states make to address a variety of differences in expected health care costs.
Age, Sex and Region. Virtually all states adjust for age and sex, while over 70 percent make regional adjustments ( 
Rate Standardization Methodology

Standardizing Rate Cells across All States
In order to compare capitation rates across states, adjustments were made to account for the variations in each of the areas mentioned above. These adjustments do not include changes to rates due to an initiation of new contracts, presence of or variation in stop-loss or reinsurance arrangements, unreported differences in carved-out services across states, and selection bias under capitated programs with voluntary enrollment.
Once the adjustments were made to the state-submitted capitation rates, the following set of standardized rates were calculated for each state:
Infants up to 1 year old. Males and females ages 1 through 13. Females ages 14 through 34. Males ages 14 through 44. Females ages 35 through 44. Males and females ages 45 through 64.
The basic idea behind the rate standardization is as follows. We first disaggregate state-submitted rate information by each year of age, sex, and region for each state.
These data are used to aggregate state submitted rate information into our six groups. We then create blended rates for states with separate capitation rates for AFDC/TANF and PRW or PRC, standardize treatment of maternity care costs across states-particularly, the use of lump-sum payments for delivery expenses, and reduce rates by estimated DSH and/or GME dollar amounts for states that included DSH and/or GME payments in their capitation rates. We then use 1990 U.S. Census data on the population below 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) as weights to aggregate across age, sex, and region to calculate statewide rates for each of our six groups 2 . Finally, we make adjustments for carved out services by adding on the estimated pmpm dollar amounts of carved-out services to the appropriate rate cells.
Standardizing Eligibility Categories across States
Eight states paid separate rates for poverty-related women and/or children. For age-sex categories with separate poverty-related rates, we used a three-year average of Current Population Survey (CPS 1997 (CPS , 1998 (CPS , 1999 data to estimate the number of women and/or children on Medicaid who were enrolled through AFDC/TANF or poverty-related criteria and created a blended rate for each year of age, sex, and region.
In order to obtain reliable estimates of the number of AFDC/TANF and poverty-related 2 We used a three-year average of Current Population Survey (1997) (1998) (1999) data for all adjustments that were made prior to aggregating across age, gender, and region, e.g. to calculate separate weights for AFDC/TANF and poverty related women. Since aggregation required county-level data, we used 1990 U.S. Census data to create age/sex specific population weights by county. The Actuarial Research Corporation (ARC) provided estimates of carve-out dollar amounts by the six age/sex category, and calculated population weights for these groups using 1999 and 2000 (March 2000 and 2001) Current Population Survey data. These weights take into account the de-linking of Medicaid and AFDC/TANF. We used the population weights calculated by the ARC to aggregate across the six age/sex categories to obtain statewide capitation rates.
eligibles, we used national CPS data for all but one state (Texas). State level CPS data were used to calculate blended rates for Texas since the sample size was large enough for this state (no other states with large CPS samples had separate rates for AFDC/TANF and poverty related groups).
Standardizing Treatment of Maternity Expenses across States
Adjustments were made to rates for newborns and females in childbearing years (ages 14 to 34 and 35 to 44) to incorporate these special maternity payments into standardized rate cells. The adjustments for maternity payments are intended to create comparable rates across states for the age-sex categories that were affected by these special payment arrangements and are described in detail below.
For states that paid separate lump-sum payments, we incorporated the lump-sum payment amounts into Medicaid capitation rates for females ages 14 to 34 and females ages 35 to 45. We first converted the lump-sum payment to a monthly basis and then apply these payments to the percentage of pregnant women on Medicaid within each of the two age groups. We estimated the percentage of pregnant women among females ages 14 to 34 and 35 to 44 enrolled in Medicaid using a three-year average of CPS data When states paid separate rates for PRW, we created blended rates for females ages 14 to 34 and 35 to 44 by calculating a weighted average of the two rates using counts of women on Medicaid who were enrolled through AFDC/TANF and pregnant women on Medicaid enrolled through poverty-related criteria. Again, we used a threeyear average of CPS data to obtain these estimates. In the case where a state paid a separate rate for all pregnant women (AFDC/TANF and PRW), we simply used the national CPS estimates of pregnant females on Medicaid for the two age groups described above to create blended rates.
For states that transferred some pregnancy expenses into newborn rates, we first estimated the amount of excess capitation, the portion of the newborn capitation attributable to pregnancy related costs, and transferred that amount to females ages 14 to 34 and 35 to 44. We used data from states that did not include maternity expenses in newborn rates to calculate "typical" differentials between rates for children less than one and children of other ages (e.g. how much more states paid for age two vs. less than age one, ages 1 to 5 vs. less than age one). We used these differentials to estimate the excess capitation for the remaining states. For example, assume that, for states without maternity adjustment, we estimated that newborns were 1.5 times as costly as children ages 1 to 2, 2.5 times as costly as children ages 1 to 5. We assumed these would be the appropriate differences in capitation rates, absent any pregnancy related expenses. We then took the difference between the newborn rate originally submitted by a state and our estimate of the newborn rate based on the capitation rate for children in the same region, and applied the excess amount to rate cells for females ages 14 to 34 and 35 to 44 using the national CPS estimates of the percentages of pregnant women on Medicaid in each of these age groups. The effects of these maternity adjustments on capitation rates for females 14 to 44 are summarized in table 10.
Standardizing DSH and GME Exclusions
We made adjustments for DSH and GME by deducting the estimated pmpm equivalent amounts for DSH and/or GME payments for the relevant states. For states that included DSH payments, we estimated the DSH amounts incorporated in rates by first calculating the "share" of DSH spending attributable to adults and children from the ratio of 1998 Medicaid spending for adults and children to 1998 Medicaid spending-the most relevant year available-for the adults, children, and disabled combined (1998 HCFA-64 data). This amount, less a 5 percent adjustment for managed care savings, was converted to a pmpm equivalent using 1998 Medicaid enrollment counts for adults and children (1998 HCFA-2082 data).
Few states provided pmpm equivalent percents or dollar values for the costs of GME incorporated in the rates. If a state did not provide a pmpm equivalent for GME costs, we used the GME payment information collected for the 1998 survey and reduced the share of GME amounts from the standardized capitation rates 3 . Estimated DSH and GME deductions used in the adjustments are reported in Table 11 .
Standardizing Benefit Packages across States
To adjust for differences in carve-outs (and benefit packages, if applicable), we added the pmpm equivalent amounts of the carved out services onto the standardized rates so that the carve-out adjusted rates represented capitation rates for comparable benefit packages. The estimates for the carved out services were made by the Actuarial Research Corporation (ARC). Due to constraints in available data, estimates were limited to six service categories: (1) mental health, (2) substance abuse, (3) dental, (4) vision, (5) prescription drugs, and (6) Finally, when a state did not provide cost information on carved-out services, ARC used the donor databases to estimate spending on the specific service relative to total spending for adults (14 years and above) and children (0 to 13 years). ARC then applied the resulting percentage to the capitation rates to obtain pmpm estimates for the carved out service for adults and children. Relative spending ratios within adult and child rate cells were used to distribute the estimated pmpm dollar amounts to the four adult and two child rate cells, except when a state used a single rate. For states with a single rate, the estimated carve-out amounts were smoothed across all age groups. carve-out pmpm data, while the lower panel is for states that indicated they carved out the service but did not provide cost information. We used a two-year average of CPS (2000, 2001 ) data on non-SSI Medicaid recipients to weight the carve-out rates across states to produce the estimates in Table 12 . The carve-out amounts were generally comparable in these two groups, with the exception of pharmacy costs. The estimates of pharmacy carve-out rates for states that did not provide data are consistently higher than states that did submit cost information. However, since only California, New Jersey, and North Carolina provided pmpm estimates for their pharmacy carve-outs, the weighted average of carve-out rates for these three states may not be representative of other states.
Moreover, the differences are small in magnitude compared with the capitation rates and are not likely to affect our results.
Payment Rates
The basic results of these various adjustments are presented in Tables 13 and 14 . Table 13 provides data for each of the six categories for all states that provided data. The table shows that the highest rates were for newborns and the lowest for children ages one to thirteen. Recall that we attempted to exclude the cost of childbirth from the newborn rates. While the adjustment was inevitably imperfect, the end result was an average capitation rate for newborns of $251. The average rate for children ages one to thirteen was $93. For females in the prime childbearing years (14-34 years of age) the average rate after adjustment for the various ways states treat maternity expenses was $219. The greatest variation among states was for newborns with a coefficient variation of .46. The least variation was among females ages 14-34 where the coefficient variation was .29.
Stated differently, there was about a tenfold variation in rates for newborns and about a threefold variation for females 14-34. while only about 40% are children between the ages of 1 and 13. In these states, capitation rates are higher when state weights rather than national weights are used. We can make useful comparisons by using Medicare data, under the assumption that although Medicare expenditures are clearly higher than for a Medicaid or private non-elderly population, they should be generally reflective of the relative variations among states in fee-for-service expenditures. If the variation in Medicare rates is highly correlated with the variation in private sector rates, it will be indicative of the relative adequacy of Medicaid rates compared to commercial rates. Prior to the Balanced Budget Act (BBA), Medicare rates were based on county level fee-for-service expenditures.
Since the BBA, there has been a 2% limit (in most years) on growth in rates in high cost counties and a floor in low cost counties. Thus, this is not as clear a comparison as one would like but is probably the best available. To make these comparisons we used the county level Medicare adjusted average per capita cost, or AAPCC. We used weights only for those counties for which states provided us Medicaid rates; i.e., only those counties with fully capitated MMC.
The results are shown in Table 16 . Column 1 provides the state weighted Medicaid managed care rates shown in number of other factors matter as well. We discussed these in our previous report and they merit being repeated.
The first factor that determines the adequacy of a set of rates is the history of managed care in the state. In a state that has many plans and a highly competitive commercial market it is likely that more plans will be willing to participate in Medicaid at a given level of rates, all else being equal. On the other hand, if managed care is relatively new and there is relatively little competition, rates would have to be higher to attract the entry of a sufficient number of plans.
Second, the adequacy of rates depends on the plans' ability and willingness to adapt to the product being purchased by the state. The cost of health care is not simply exogenous. Managed care plans have some flexibility in adapting the product to serve the Medicaid population, e.g. the number of providers in a network, utilization controls and provider payment rates. The willingness to adapt the product may be limited by concerns about how the plan will be viewed in the broader commercial and Medicare markets or that it will be identified as a "Medicaid plan." A plan obtaining the reputation for providing limited access in the Medicaid market may be tarnished in its ability to compete elsewhere.
Third, rate adequacy will be affected by the amount of excess provider capacity in the states. Plans that can take advantage of an excess supply of doctors and hospitals and negotiate lower provider payment rates will be more likely to accept lower capitation rates from the state. In states where these conditions do not exist, plans will not be able to negotiate low provider payment rates and capitation rates will have to be higher to allow plans to cover those costs.
Fourth, the degree of Medicaid managed care regulation will affect the adequacy of rates. The more regulation the higher the cost of doing business as a managed care
plan. Rates will have to be higher in "high regulation" states to attract a sufficient number of plans.
Fifth, other state policies can affect how plans will view the rates. For example, states that make a high level of disproportionate share payments to hospitals will probably be able to pay lower capitation rates. Hospitals will be able to accept lower rates from managed care plans because they are receiving Medicaid revenues from other sources. All of these reasons suggest that the reported level of rates should not be used to suggest that one state's rates are adequate and another's are not.
In constructing these rates we had to make a number of estimates and adjustments. For example, we adjusted for maternity costs, GME, DSH and several carve-outs. We did not adjust for the use of stop-loss arrangements. To the extent there were errors in these adjustments and key differences in the factors that are not accounted for, the rates we report will be affected. However, we do not expect these problems to be
large. An additional caveat is that these rates apply to only AFDC/TANF and povertyrelated groups and do not reflect the relative payment that states make to other population groups.
Despite these caveats, the results show more than a twofold variation among states in rates, as they did in 1998, for fairly comparable populations. Even if our various adjustments were perfect that reality would not be much changed. The key issue is whether the rates that states are paying yield satisfactory levels of plan participation, beneficiary access and quality of care. If states with low rates have plenty of plans participating and no issues of access or quality, its rates can be presumed to be adequate.
But most likely states are getting what they paid for, in terms of the number and the kinds of plans participating, in beneficiary access and quality of care. States with low rates are probably not buying the same product as states with higher rates. The implications of these product differences for beneficiary access, quality of care and health are beyond the scope of the study. Note : Three states with capitated MMC (Nebraska, Oregon, and Tennessee) did not respond to the survey. Notes: PRW = poverty-related pregnant women, PRN = poverty-related newborns, PRC = poverty-related children. Rates do not include subsequent adjustments for disproportionate share hospital, graduate medical education provisions, and carved-out services. 1\ Capitation rates before and after the maternity adjustments are the same because the state submitted pregnancy cost adjusted capitation rates. Notes : DSH = disproportionate share hospital, GME = graduate medical education, PMPM = per member per month. GME PMPM estimates are in percentages since the majority of the states that included GME payments in their capitation rates provided GME estimates as a share of their capitation payments. 
